Thursday, November 5, 2009

Pirates of The Mediterranean

And so Israel has stopped a ship that was said to be carrying Iranian arms and heading to Syria or Hezbollah. and as the ship has not even came close to the Israeli marine territory a basic question comes to the picture which is "who has gaven Israel the right to control, check or interfere with the international marine navigation?"

The answer to the above question would simply be "gained by force, legalized by politics, covered by some great media and strengthened by the usual Arabian weakness."







Wednesday, May 6, 2009

Rising to Obama's Challenge. . .


The current whirlwind of international diplomacy in the Middle East may deliver little or nothing, but at least it is putting local participants on their toes and pushing them to show some initiative. And for all the talk of the decline of US influence, this dynamism is prompted primarily by the willingness of the US administration to work all the difficult tracks at once, from a drawdown in Iraq and engagement of Iran to the overture to Syria and movement on the Israeli-Palestinian front.

If the approach is new and ambitious, the overarching theme of US policy remains vague. The region has heard a lot from Barack Obama about respect, a laudable principle, and engagement, which is a method, not an objective. Enough has been done to change the atmospherics. What is needed now is a major policy pronouncement that describes the US regional goal, explains how Washington will achieve it and puts the onus on Middle Eastern players.

Understandably, this may have to wait for the conclusion of the current consultations between the US and its Middle Eastern allies. George Mitchell, the US peace envoy, has visited the region several times. King Abdullah of Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit the White House: the Egyptian, Palestinian and Israeli leaders will follow soon. Dennis Ross, the senior adviser on Iran, is on a tour of the Gulf states to reassure them that no sell-out to Iran is in the works. By mid-June, the Lebanese and Iranian elections will further clarify the regional balance of power, and on Barack Obama’s first visit to Israel and Palestine as president he is expected to lay out his peace vision. 

Mr Obama is undoubtedly reflecting on the record of his predecessors. During the Clinton administration the view was that Arab-Israeli peace would profoundly transform the region. The problem was that it viewed the Middle East through the narrowest lens, with Mr Clinton missing the rise and meaning of political Islam and its violent streak, oblivious to the region’s economic and political backwardness. The US put Iraq and Iran in the freezer, a policy known as dual containment. The Clinton approach turned most Arab states into free riders, not asking them to do much to ensure their own stability and progress.

George Bush had little interest in the Middle East at first, until 9/11 inspired him to an ambitious and aggressive transformational agenda with profoundly disruptive consequences. Middle Eastern states buckled their seat belts for the ride, hoping to survive it: which all but Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did. 

If Mr Clinton had a post-Cold War opportunity and Mr Bush had 9/11, Mr Obama has only himself: he is the only new factor that could positively affect the region’s affairs, but ambition alone does not work, as his predecessors learnt the hard way. Despite all the current activity there is no obvious opportunity for breakthroughs, just the promise of long, treacherous and frustrating diplomacy.

Where does all that leave local actors? It is forcing them into a delicate game of triangulation, posturing and bluff that was sorely missed in previous years. The strength of the various alliances will be tested, and unlikely convergences of interests may emerge.

Indeed, Mr Obama’s softer image and, in the words of The New York Times’s Roger Cohen, his “mellow doctrine” are depriving America’s enemies of arguments and puzzling its allies. This mix of anticipation and edginess gives the US a tactical advantage in that it seems to be the only source of fresh ideas. Has Iran had any of late, if ever? Does Israel ever show any sign of constructive flexibility? Can the Gulf states lose their fear of Iran and not overreact to overtures? Will Syria offer more than tactical and cosmetic concessions?

The difficulty for an eager Obama diplomacy is to orchestrate all these tracks at once, manage the subtle shifts they induce and counter perceptions of retreat and weakness. Beneath the shower of praise that Mr Obama is receiving from Syrian officials, the prospect of US engagement with Iran has made Syria jittery. Damascus would have preferred progress on normalisation with Washington first to cash in on the perception that prying Syria away can weaken Iran, just as it would have liked priority for the Syrian-Israeli track over the Israeli-Palestinian one.


Egypt, resenting its battered standing in the Arab world, is trying to make itself indispensable to the Obama administration by shepherding Palestinian reconciliation talks and to the rest of the Arab world by leading the fight against perceived Iranian penetration (hence the unusually public row with Hizbollah). 

The Gulf states, nervously anticipating the US-Iran talks, hope to make themselves more relevant to Washington’s priorities in Iraq, Afghanistan and the peace process, thereby gaining influence in how Washington talks to Tehran. Israel’s right-wing government, taken aback by the determination of the Obama administration to make progress on peace, is working to redirect US diplomacy on Iran, which would conveniently delay any concession to the Palestinians. Iran is torn between declaring a hollow victory or accepting a US overture that would put unprecedented pressure on the Islamic Republic (maybe this is why powerful constituencies that stand to lose from any detente are trying to sabotage it with their treatment of the Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi). Even Hamas is working hard to polish its image. “I promise the American administration and the international community that we will be part of the solution, period,” says its leader Khaled Meshaal.

The Obama approach does not necessarily imply a redefinition of US interests, with the notable exception of Iraq. Many local actors will bemoan this, but the reality is that there is consensus in Washington on most issues. US desires and diktats need not prevail, but for this to happen, Middle East actors will have to show more flexibility and originality.

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

An Israeli ‘settlement freeze’ is an all-too-frequent ruse


While supporters of a two-state solution continue to insist that Israel freeze settlement construction in the West Bank, there is something quite maddening about this entire enterprise.

The US has called on Israel to halt settlements for over three decades now. On at least a half dozen occasions, Israel has appeared to acquiesce to these demands. Nevertheless, settlements continue to expand their range like an invasive disease, eating up more Palestinian land, as evidenced by a recent Israeli press report noting that 15,000 new units have been authorised, with another 58,000 under consideration. If completed, this will nearly double the number of Israelis living in the West Bank.

It’s an old story.

When a Likud government signed the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978, President Jimmy Carter secured (or so he thought) a commitment from then-prime minister Menachem Begin to stop construction. Back then, the US State Department legal adviser had ruled that settlements in occupied lands were illegal, as they were in contravention of international law that forbade the occupying power from transferring its population into territory its military is holding.

At that time, there were approximately 6,500 settlers living in the West Bank, with another 40,000 living in settlements in occupied areas around Jerusalem. The West Bank settlements were mostly along the “green line” and in the Jordan Valley, having been established by the previous Labour government, which claimed they were for “security purposes”.

The Likud government changed all that. They initiated efforts to implement what was then called the “Drobles Plan” outlined in the World Zionist Congress “Master Plan for Development of Judea and Samaria”. According to Matitiyahu Drobles, the purpose was “to make concrete and realise our right to Eretz Israel” by constructing “settlements and roads around the settlements of the minorities (the Palestinians) but also in between them”, in order, as one Israeli analyst wrote in Time Magazine, “to carve (the West Bank) by a grid of roads; settlements and strongholds into a score of little Bantustans so that (the Palestinians) shall never coalesce again into a contiguous area that can support autonomous, let alone independent, existence”.

And so, throughout the 1980s, settlements and roads continued to be built, with the West Bank settler population reaching 90,000 by 1991, and the number in the Jerusalem area having grown to more than 137,000. In that year, there was another agreed-upon “settlement freeze”. In the lead up to the Madrid peace conference, the US Secretary of State James Baker, seeking an exchange of confidence-building measures, convinced Arab states to suspend their secondary boycott of Israel and to participate in an international peace conference in exchange for Israel’s agreement to a freeze.

With the signing of the Oslo Accords, in 1993, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to refrain from any actions that might “prejudice the final outcome” – understood to be yet another commitment by Israel to stop building settlements and roads throughout the occupied territories. Despite this, the most rapid construction and expansion of both occurred during the “peace years” of the 1990s. By the end of that decade, the settler population doubled and the West Bank was further carved up by a security-enhanced “Jewish only” highway system connecting the settlements to each other and Israel proper.

There were other efforts to stop settlements. President George HW Bush, in an effort to put a price-tag on Israeli non-compliance, announced that each year he would deduct from loan guarantees that the US was providing Israel, an amount equal to what Israel spent on settlement construction. This practice was continued by President Clinton. The Clinton Administration also attempted to put brakes on then-prime minister Netanyahu’s efforts to construct a new settlement near Bethlehem. After a short halt, plans continued. Today, “Har Homa”, as it is called, hosts 19,000 settlers. Even President George W Bush criticised settlement growth and maintained that, under the “Road Map”, Israel was obligated to freeze settlements.

There are today nearly half a million settlers living in occupied lands (including those in occupied areas around Jerusalem). And more are on the way.

The continuing calls to freeze them and Israel’s ignoring of these calls reminds me of the parent telling the child to “stop”, only to stand by while the child continues. The realisation that there are no consequences for bad behaviour only emboldens, and creates a sense of entitlement. To make matters worse, even while calling for a freeze, in April of 2004, President Bush delivered an infamous letter to Ariel Sharon in which the US recognised what the letter called “realities” on the ground; ie, the large settlement blocs that are protected behind the “separation barrier”. In other words, what were “illegal”, “obstacles to peace”, or “violations” of the Oslo Accords and the Road map are now “realities” that Palestinians must accept.

With half a million settlers living in about 170 settlements strategically placed throughout the West Bank and surrounding Jerusalem, with another 100 outposts, 600 checkpoints, miles of roads and a wall/barrier that cuts deep into the heart of Palestinian lands – the dream of Drobles is being realised.

At this point, it is critical to recognise that if a two-state solution is to be achieved, calls for a “settlement freeze” are not enough. Not only are they hollow (and, therefore, ignored), but they ignore the reality that there cannot be a contiguous viable Palestinian state with intrusive settlements cutting into Palestinian territory, designed and placed as they were, with the specific intention of making such a state impossible.

Those who want to see a two-state solution cannot continue to accept – and reward – this bad behaviour. If we are serious about two states (and some may not be), it is time to call not for a new freeze, but for a removal of settlements.

Saturday, March 14, 2009

Kaffiyehs are now ‘as Palestinian as wonton soup’


It is the ultimate Palestinian symbol, almost a global brand. Walk the narrow alleys of Hebron’s old city and the white and black chequered kaffiyeh is everywhere, either hanging outside shops or draped around necks, old and young.

But the likelihood is that the kaffiyehs on show here are now as Palestinian as won ton soup. Cheap imports, often from China, have had a devastating effect on traditional local Palestinian industries, with everything from soap factories to olive oil production adversely affected.

Not far up the hill from the shops of Hebron’s old city lies the last Palestinian textile company to make kaffiyehs. The Herbawi Textile Factory, established in 1960, is an institution in Hebron, but Yasser Mohammed Herbawi, the factory’s owner, said he was struggling in the face of cheap imports.

“I was the first and now I am the last to make kaffiyehs in Palestine,” he said shaking his kaffiyeh-wrapped head in mock disbelief. “I am trying to persuade the Palestinian Authority that they must do more to protect local businesses like mine.”

Mr Herbawi, 76, estimated that he makes some 120 kaffiyehs a day, enough to make a living, he said, but nowhere near what it was in the heyday.

He said he was trying to convince policymakers to raise taxes on imports that threaten local manufacturing.

But it is not only import-export regulations that Mr Herbawi must contend with. Where he once used to sell his products across the West Bank and Gaza as well as Israel, Israeli-imposed restrictions on movements mean he can now sell only in the West Bank, more than halving his potential market.

And even in the West Bank, the situation is difficult.

“The cost of distribution for local manufacturers is high because of the 600-plus checkpoints across the West Bank,” said Nahed Freij, the project manager with InTajuna (Our Products), which seeks to promote and enhance the market for local products.

Ms Freij said with the Palestinian economy ultimately dependent on the Israeli economy and unable to function independently, local industries have been hard hit by the past eight years of political instability.

Of 120 local manufacturers registered with the PA, InTajuna found that only about 79 are actually functioning.

With Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods both within and outside the occupied territories as well as the high cost of production that comes with being tied to the more developed Israeli economy, imports, especially Chinese imports, are simply cheaper. And in the straitened economic circumstances of the occupied territories, price is king.

“Most people can’t tell what is locally made and what is not,” said Jamal Maraga, whose shop in the old city of Hebron specialises in local handicrafts. “And if a locally made pillow case costs 100 shekels [Dh320] and an import is 10, people will go for the cheaper one.”

Mr Maraga, however, said he believed proper labelling would be very effective. Mr Herbawi’s kaffiyehs, for example, are unlabelled and to the untrained eye almost impossible to distinguish from cheaper imports. Mr Herbawi said he was working to remedy that and would start stamping his products from next month.

“People should buy locally and encourage local industries,” said Mr Maraga. “I think enough people take pride in Palestinian products to be willing to pay a little more to do that.”

However, Ms Freij was not so sure.

“Palestinian consumers tend to view Palestinian products as of inferior quality and tend to trust foreign or Israeli-made products more.”

In order to change consumer perception, said Ms Freij, local manufacturers needed help in both packaging and marketing.

“The quality is good, but consumers don’t necessarily see that,” she said.

Perceptions matter. Mr Herbawi started with two mechanical looms in 1960. The 1960s saw the height of the popularity and activities of the fedayeen, the fighters of the PLO who traditionally wore the kaffiyeh, as did, most famously, their leader, Yasser Arafat. Mr Herbawi rode that wave and quickly expanded production until, in 1973, he bought his 16th loom.

Now, however, Abdel Aziz Karaki, 56, flits between the only four machines that are still operating to make sure the thread is straight and the looms are functioningº properly. Mr Karaki has worked for Mr Herbawi since he was 15 and seemed devastated at the factory’s sinking fortunes.

“I am very proud to do this work, I consider it a national duty. If people know nothing about Palestine, they will know the kaffiyeh.”

The kaffiyeh has certainly flickered in and out of fashion across the world for decades. In the 1970s, it was a favoured accessory for left-wingers and students across Europe. In this decade, different-coloured kaffiyehs became a more mainstream fashion accessory, even if its roots still managed to cause controversy.

In 2007, the US clothing store chain Urban Outfitters stopped selling its version of the scarf after protests by pro-Israel groups.

Dunkin’ Donuts, improbably, also got embroiled in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict when it was forced to pull an ad that featured the US TV chef Rachel Ray wearing a paisley-patterned scarf that was too close to the kaffiyeh for the comfort of some.

Shrill and rather ridiculous as such protests are, the traditional pattern on the black and white kaffiyeh does have a political subtext, said Mr Maraga. The middle pattern, reminiscent of a wire mesh fence, represents the Israeli occupation. The oval-shaped black patterns on the side of the kaffiyeh, meanwhile, represent the leaves of the olive tree, a traditional symbol of both Palestine and peace.

“It the saddest thing that kaffiyehs are now mostly made outside and in all these different colours,” Ms Freij said. “This is our symbol. It’s almost a trademark. To see something like the kaffiyeh being mainly an import is hard to bear.”

Don’t turn these bigots into martyrs for free speech


Bishop Richard Williamson has some very peculiar, and frankly odious, views: that no Jews were murdered in gas chambers during the Second World War II; that the Twin Towers were brought down by American explosives, not by airliners, on September 11, 2001; and that Jews are fighting to dominate the world “to prepare the anti-Christ’s throne in Jerusalem”.

And these are just some of his opinions on secular matters.
On questions of Roman Catholic doctrine, his views were considered so out of line with the modern Church that the Vatican excommunicated him in 1988, along with other members of the ultraconservative Society of St Pius X, founded by the fascist sympathiser Marcel Lefebvre. Supporters of Bishop Williamson include the British historian David Irving, who was recently jailed in Austria for glorifying the Nazis.
The bishop, then, does not strike one as an attractive man. But does he deserve everything now hanging over his head?

As a consequence of the views he expressed on Swedish television, he was denied re-entry into the Church, as had been promised by Pope Benedict, which is probably just as well.

But he was also kicked out of Argentina, where he lived, and is threatened with extradition to Germany, where preparations are being made to prosecute him for Holocaust denial.
Meanwhile, consider the case of another unappealing man: the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who was banned last month from entering the United Kingdom, where he had planned to show his short film, entitled Fitna, which describes Islam as a terrorist faith.

Back in Holland, a case is being made against him in an Amsterdam court for “spreading hatred” against Muslims. He has compared the Quran to Hitler’s Mein Kampf, and wishes to stop immigration of Muslims to the Netherlands.
The British ban, as well as the impending court case, has actually made Wilders more popular in the Netherlands, where one poll indicated that his populist anti-Muslim party, the PVV, would win 27 seats in parliament if elections were held today.

The reason for Wilders’ surging popularity, apart from widespread distrust of Muslims, is that he has successfully cultivated an image as a fighter for free speech.
The principle of free speech means that we must live with views that we find reprehensible, up to a point: the question is, up to what point?

Laws on free speech differ from country to country. It is a criminal offence in various European democracies, including France, Germany, and Austria, to express the view that the Holocaust never happened.

Many democratic countries also have laws against inciting violence or hatred. Some countries, including the Netherlands, even have laws against deliberately insulting people on the grounds of their race or religion.
Bishop Williamson’s ideas may be loathsome, but criminal prosecution against a man for his views about history is probably a bad idea. He should be criticised, even ridiculed, but not jailed.

Similarly, it would have been much better to let Wilders show his wretched film in Britain than to ban him. Whatever one thinks of laws against spreading hatred or insulting people, the law remains a blunt instrument when it comes to matters of speech.
Nevertheless, free speech is not absolute. Even Wilders, with his absurd call to ban the Quran, clearly believes that there are limits – for his opponents, of course, not for himself. But it is not so easy to define precisely what those limits should be, for they depend on who says what to whom, and even where.

Bishop Williamson’s opinions suddenly mattered because this obscure, excommunicated priest was about to be reinstated by the Pope. This would have given institutional legitimacy to his private views. In the case of Wilders, it makes a difference that he is a politician, not just a private individual, pandering to dangerous prejudices against a vulnerable minority.
In civilised life, people refrain from saying many things, regardless of questions of legality. Words used by young black men among themselves in American cities would have a very different resonance if young white men used them. Mocking the ways and beliefs of minorities is not quite the same thing as taking on the cherished habits and views of majorities.

If this smacks of political correctness, then so be it. But civilised life, especially in countries with great ethnic and religious diversity, would soon break down if everyone felt free to say anything they liked to anyone. The problem is where to draw the line.

Legally, this should probably be the point where words are designed to result in violence. Socially, there are too many variables to establish an absolute, universal principle. The proper limits must be constantly tested, contested, and renegotiated.
People like Bishop Williamson and Geert Wilders are useful to the extent that they allow us to do just that. Let them speak, so that they can be judged, not in court, but by contrary opinions. Banning them only allows them to pose as martyrs to free speech. And that not only makes it harder to attack their views, but also gives free speech a bad name.