Rising to Obama's Challenge. . .

The current whirlwind of international diplomacy in the Middle East may deliver little or nothing, but at least it is putting local participants on their toes and pushing them to show some initiative. And for all the talk of the decline of US influence, this dynamism is prompted primarily by the willingness of the US administration to work all the difficult tracks at once, from a drawdown in Iraq and engagement of Iran to the overture to Syria and movement on the Israeli-Palestinian front.

If the approach is new and ambitious, the overarching theme of US policy remains vague. The region has heard a lot from Barack Obama about respect, a laudable principle, and engagement, which is a method, not an objective. Enough has been done to change the atmospherics. What is needed now is a major policy pronouncement that describes the US regional goal, explains how Washington will achieve it and puts the onus on Middle Eastern players.

Understandably, this may have to wait for the conclusion of the current consultations between the US and its Middle Eastern allies. George Mitchell, the US peace envoy, has visited the region several times. King Abdullah of Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit the White House: the Egyptian, Palestinian and Israeli leaders will follow soon. Dennis Ross, the senior adviser on Iran, is on a tour of the Gulf states to reassure them that no sell-out to Iran is in the works. By mid-June, the Lebanese and Iranian elections will further clarify the regional balance of power, and on Barack Obama’s first visit to Israel and Palestine as president he is expected to lay out his peace vision. 

Mr Obama is undoubtedly reflecting on the record of his predecessors. During the Clinton administration the view was that Arab-Israeli peace would profoundly transform the region. The problem was that it viewed the Middle East through the narrowest lens, with Mr Clinton missing the rise and meaning of political Islam and its violent streak, oblivious to the region’s economic and political backwardness. The US put Iraq and Iran in the freezer, a policy known as dual containment. The Clinton approach turned most Arab states into free riders, not asking them to do much to ensure their own stability and progress.

George Bush had little interest in the Middle East at first, until 9/11 inspired him to an ambitious and aggressive transformational agenda with profoundly disruptive consequences. Middle Eastern states buckled their seat belts for the ride, hoping to survive it: which all but Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did. 

If Mr Clinton had a post-Cold War opportunity and Mr Bush had 9/11, Mr Obama has only himself: he is the only new factor that could positively affect the region’s affairs, but ambition alone does not work, as his predecessors learnt the hard way. Despite all the current activity there is no obvious opportunity for breakthroughs, just the promise of long, treacherous and frustrating diplomacy.

Where does all that leave local actors? It is forcing them into a delicate game of triangulation, posturing and bluff that was sorely missed in previous years. The strength of the various alliances will be tested, and unlikely convergences of interests may emerge.

Indeed, Mr Obama’s softer image and, in the words of The New York Times’s Roger Cohen, his “mellow doctrine” are depriving America’s enemies of arguments and puzzling its allies. This mix of anticipation and edginess gives the US a tactical advantage in that it seems to be the only source of fresh ideas. Has Iran had any of late, if ever? Does Israel ever show any sign of constructive flexibility? Can the Gulf states lose their fear of Iran and not overreact to overtures? Will Syria offer more than tactical and cosmetic concessions?

The difficulty for an eager Obama diplomacy is to orchestrate all these tracks at once, manage the subtle shifts they induce and counter perceptions of retreat and weakness. Beneath the shower of praise that Mr Obama is receiving from Syrian officials, the prospect of US engagement with Iran has made Syria jittery. Damascus would have preferred progress on normalisation with Washington first to cash in on the perception that prying Syria away can weaken Iran, just as it would have liked priority for the Syrian-Israeli track over the Israeli-Palestinian one.

Egypt, resenting its battered standing in the Arab world, is trying to make itself indispensable to the Obama administration by shepherding Palestinian reconciliation talks and to the rest of the Arab world by leading the fight against perceived Iranian penetration (hence the unusually public row with Hizbollah). 

The Gulf states, nervously anticipating the US-Iran talks, hope to make themselves more relevant to Washington’s priorities in Iraq, Afghanistan and the peace process, thereby gaining influence in how Washington talks to Tehran. Israel’s right-wing government, taken aback by the determination of the Obama administration to make progress on peace, is working to redirect US diplomacy on Iran, which would conveniently delay any concession to the Palestinians. Iran is torn between declaring a hollow victory or accepting a US overture that would put unprecedented pressure on the Islamic Republic (maybe this is why powerful constituencies that stand to lose from any detente are trying to sabotage it with their treatment of the Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi). Even Hamas is working hard to polish its image. “I promise the American administration and the international community that we will be part of the solution, period,” says its leader Khaled Meshaal.

The Obama approach does not necessarily imply a redefinition of US interests, with the notable exception of Iraq. Many local actors will bemoan this, but the reality is that there is consensus in Washington on most issues. US desires and diktats need not prevail, but for this to happen, Middle East actors will have to show more flexibility and originality.